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A thought experiment involving an omniscient being and quantum me-
chanics is used to justify non-deductive methods in mathematics. The 
twin prime conjecture is used to illustrate what can be achieved.
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There is a standard view of mathematics that says proofs are the one 
and only source of evidence and proofs are deductive derivations from 
fi rst principles. This attitude has a long tradition and there is a com-
forting surety about it. But occasionally there are voices in opposition, 
including one that should be particularly infl uential.
If mathematics describes an objective world just like physics, there is no 
reason why inductive methods should not be applied in mathematics just 
the same as in physics. The fact is that in mathematics we still have the 
same attitude today that in former times one had toward all science, namely 
we try to derive everything by cogent proofs from the defi nitions (that is, in 
ontological terminology, from the essences of things). Perhaps this meth-
od, if it claims monopoly, is as wrong in mathematics as it was in physics. 
(Gödel 1995 [1951], vol. III: 313)
I’m going to argue for the same conclusion, but I will come at it in a 
very different way. Instead of trying directly to liberalize the notion of 
evidence in mathematics, I will assume certainty in physics, that is, I 
will assume that the fi rst principles of quantum mechanics (QM) are 
just as certain as the Peano axioms (PA), the fi rst principles of arith-
metic. The consequence for what counts as legitimate mathematical 
methods will surprise.
Let’s begin with a parable. God parts the clouds and says: “Verily, 
verily I say unto you, the principles of quantum mechanics are true.” 
Imagine God as you will. I picture Athena, goddess of wisdom and pa-
tron of science. But be sure to include her being omniscient and truth-
ful. This means we can now know with certainty that quantum states 
are represented by vectors in Hilbert space; they evolve according to the 
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Schrödinger equation; the Born rule will give us the right probabilities 
for measurement outcomes; and so on. We now have perfect confi dence 
in the truth of the standard principles of QM, which until now were 
merely empirically well justifi ed. And we also know that anything we 
can derive from those fi rst principles, such as Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle, is unquestionably true, since logic preserves truth.
So far, so good, but we have more questions for God to answer: Is 
QM complete, in the sense of implying yes or no to every QM question? 
If P is a consequence of QM, can we derive it in a feasible time? What is 
the relation of QM to other theories? Do chemistry and biology reduce 
to QM or not? Other questions will readily come to mind.
We ask, but God won’t answer. She smiles benignly then, alas, de-
parts. (Athena frequently helped Odysseus out of a jam, then left him 
to fend for himself.) Suppose this is how things now stand with us. We 
now know much with certainty. But we remain either ignorant or only 
mildly confi dent of much else in QM. How should we proceed?
Obviously, we should try to construct derivations for as many 
propositions as possible. But what about the rest? We would probably 
continue as before. That is, we would continue with a combination of 
conjectures and experimental testing. Aside from the parts of QM that 
are clearly certain, it would be business as usual. We would continue 
to argue over what this involves but details would be more or less the 
same. There will be experimental probing, hypothesis testing, the use 
of various statistical techniques, thought experiments, philosophical 
considerations, and so on.
We would continue to tackle many problems the way we do current-
ly. For example, perhaps there is a derivation of the details of protein 
folding from the principles of QM, but no such derivation can be found 
by humans. Calculating the energy levels of complex objects is hope-
lessly diffi cult. U235 is a many-body problem that can’t be exactly solved. 
Quantum fi eld theory is a relativistic extension of QM, not derivable 
from it. What about dark energy? Is this even a QM problem? God is no 
help in answering these questions. We have to carry on as before.
The upshot from all of this is that some physics is certain and some 
is not, and we will continue to learn about the latter in the same old em-
pirical, fallible, inductive way. Why not demand certainty everywhere 
in QM? The argument for not doing this, if one is needed, is simple: 
Pre-God we have lots of justifi ed but fallible beliefs involving QM. Then 
God tells us that part of this is in fact certain knowledge. Great news. 
Do we abandon the remaining justifi ed beliefs on the grounds that they 
are not certain? No, since their status as justifi ed but fallible beliefs 
remains unchanged from what it was before God certifi ed some of it. In 
that respect, nothing has changed. The fact that God certifi es some of 
it should not turn us into sceptics about the rest.
Of course, it is still debatable precisely what good scientifi c method 
is, but that is a detail that need not trouble us here. Most of QM re-
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mains fallible by anybody’s lights and should be investigated empiri-
cally and inductively. We have certain knowledge of the fi rst principles 
of QM and their deductive consequences. The rest of QM has the same 
status as it had before God intervened. Does this have consequences for 
our knowledge claims elsewhere?
Let’s turn to mathematics, where the common attitude is that much 
of it is certain knowledge (and we don’t need God to tell us). I’ll stick to 
an elementary part, basic arithmetic, which, for most of us, is probably 
as certain as anything could be.
There is a common ideology that goes along with the general at-
titude about mathematics. Let’s assume the Peano axioms (PA), which 
are a set of rules characterizing the natural numbers. PA says there 
is a number 0, and for each number there is a successor. Thus, 1 is 
the successor of 0; 2 is the successor of 1, and so on. There are axioms 
for addition and multiplication, and for the principle of mathematical 
induction. These axioms are typically taken to be certainly true, or at 
least as certain as anything could be. Of course, there are people who 
claim to doubt them, but there are also people who claim to doubt the 
law of non-contradiction.1
A theorem may be asserted, according to the common ideology, if 
and only if there is a proof, which is a derivation from the basic axi-
oms. (In practice a sketch of a derivation will suffi ce, but it is under-
stood that that full details could in principle be provided.) Nothing else 
should be believed, according to this ideology — a proof is the only 
evidence allowed.
All of this can be easily illustrated by a famous theorem, fi rst proved 
in Euclid’s Elements. The theorem follows from PA. Prime numbers are 
numbers that cannot be factored, that is, they cannot be divided by any 
numbers except 1 and themselves without remainder. They include: 2, 
3, 5, 7, 11, 13, … The rest are composite numbers, which are the prod-
uct of primes. For instance, 4 = 2×2, 6 = 2×3, 8 = 2×2×2, 9 = 3×3, 10 = 
2×5, 12 = 2×2×3, …, 2093 = 7×13×23, and so on. How many primes are 
there?
 Theorem: There are infi nitely many prime numbers.
 Proof: Suppose there are only fi nitely many primes. Hence, there 
is a highest p. Let q = (2×3×5×7×…×p) + 1. If q is a prime, then 
p is not the highest prime after all. If q is composite, then q is 
divisible by primes. But none of 2, 3, 5, …, p can divide q, since 
there is always a remainder of 1. Thus, some prime r must divide 
q. But r > p. Either way, p is not the highest prime. So, the initial 
1 This is perhaps unfair to those who are fi ctionalists, such as Field (2016) or 
Leng (2010). I don’t wish to debate this issue here. I assume mathematical platonism 
or some sort of realism from the outset and argue from there. The point of this paper 
is not about the ontology of mathematics, but rather its legitimate epistemology. 
What is the best way to acquire objective mathematical knowledge, assuming there 
is such a thing? (Chess knowledge, by contrast, is not objective.)
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assumption that there is a highest prime is false. Thus, there 
are infi nitely many.
Now we have two interesting systems to think about, PA and QM. The 
fi rst principles of PA and QM (post God) are both certain. Anything we 
can derive from either we can be sure is true. And yet we treat them 
differently in a fundamental way. We would be happy to go beyond the 
certain fi rst principles of QM and continue to use inductive methods 
to enlarge what we know about the physical realm. But we have been 
reluctant to do the same with PA. Their epistemic situations are the 
same, so we should have the same epistemic outlook for each.
The parallel is obvious. In the quantum case (post God), we have 
two kinds of propositions: (1) QM principles and logical consequences 
that we can actually derive and (2) all other truths of quantum me-
chanics that we cannot either practically or in principle derive. In the 
arithmetic case, we also have two kinds of propositions: (1) PA axioms 
and logical consequences we can derive from those axioms and (2) all 
other truths of arithmetic that we cannot either practically or in prin-
ciple derive.
How should we respond to this schizophrenic methodological at-
titude? Obviously we should follow the QM example and extend our 
mathematical knowledge by adding various inductive techniques to 
PA. This will have profound implications for mathematical practice. 
The twin primes conjecture will provide a good example of a more 
liberal way of proceeding. Twin primes are pairs of prime numbers of 
the form (p, p+2). For instance, (3,5), (5,7), (11,13), (17,19), and so on. 
How many are there? This is an open problem in number theory in the 
sense that there is no proof that the number of twin primes is either 
infi nite or fi nite. Number theorists have been attacking the problem 
for a long time without fi nding the answer.2 It is possible, of course 
that the problem is unsolvable, in the sense that no proof exists either 
way. We know from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem that such unsolv-
able problems exist. Euler, who is often quoted on this topic, wondered 
about the possibility. “Mathematicians have tried in vain to discover 
some order in the sequence of prime numbers but we have every reason 
to believe that there are some mysteries which the human mind will 
never penetrate.” (1710, quoted in Simmons 1992: 276n3).
To proceed, let’s take note of the Prime Number Theorem. I will use 
the standard notation 𝜋(n) for the number of primes up to n, e.g., 𝜋(10) 
= 4. The Prime Number Theorem says: 𝜋(n) ≈ n/log n. That is, the num-
ber of primes up to some number n is approximately equal to n divided 
by the natural log of n. As n gets larger, the approximation becomes 
more accurate. For example:
2 The literature on number theory, especially primes, is enormous. Extensive 
discussions can be found in Hardy and Wright (2008), Ribenboim (1991) and Shanks 
(1993).
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Cramér (1936) developed the idea that primes can be considered as 
random. If we consider them equiprobably, then the probability that a 
number less than n is prime is approximately 1/log n. The idea can be 
tweaked to address obvious problems (eg, half the numbers are even so 
not prime, aside from 2).
Think of the gap between primes. For instance, the gap between 5 
and the next prime 7 is 2; the gap between 11 and 13 is also 2, while 
the gap between 13 and the next prime 17 is 4, and so on. The apparent 
randomness of the primes will be refl ected in the randomness of the 
size of the gaps. Since there are infi nitely many primes, we can expect 
the number of gaps of size 2 to occur infi nitely often. And that means 
that primes of the form (p, p+2) will occur infi nitely often. In short, the 
twin primes conjecture is true. And it is justifi ed by rather simple but 
quite compelling inductive means.
The argument is easily generalized to prime pairs of the form (p, 
p+4), (p, p+6), and so on. There are infi nitely many pairs of each of 
these, as well, since there will be infi nitely many gaps of size 4, size 6, 
and so on. The moral to be drawn from this example is that inductive 
methods can provide legitimate evidence in mathematics more gener-
ally.
I want to stress that the foregoing argument signifi cantly differs 
from other arguments for inductive methods in mathematics. Be-
sides Gödel who was quoted at the outset, lots of people (including me 
(Brown 2008, 2017)), have argued for such a conclusion. One of the 
simplest arguments for a more liberal methodology is the fact that the 
fi rst principles cannot be proven (without begging the question), so it 
is in principle hopeless to demand that all our mathematical evidence 
be based on proofs. Another argument for mathematical fallibility is 
based on conceptual change. For instance, in the 18th century it was 
thought that all functions are continuous. The proof for this theorem 
was fl awless. The concept of function, however, changed during the 19th 
century, so that now we take a function to be an arbitrary association 
between sets. This allows the radically discontinuous Dirichlet func-
tion f(x), which equals 1 or 0, depending on whether x is rational or 
irrational.
The argument here is quite different in that it assumes that math-
ematics is in part certain. Specifi cally, the Peano axioms are taken to 
be as certain as anything. The argument then follows the lesson of QM 
resulting from the God thought experiment, namely, that inductive 
methods should supplement the known-to-be-certain fi rst principles. 
This is why the God TE at the outset is important; it guarantees the 
analogy between mathematics and physics, which is the basis of the 
argument.
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Of course, there is no God who guarantees the fi rst principles of 
QM, and we cannot continue to take those principles to be certain. The 
thought experiment has done its job and led us to a new way of viewing 
legitimate mathematical methods. Now we can treat it like Wittgen-
stein’s ladder. Toss it out and agree that even the fi rst principles of QM 
and PA are fallible, as is all knowledge, but the liberalization in what 
counts as evidence more than makes up for the loss of certainty.
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